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. Preamble and Introduction
The last 20 years has seen a growing interest in the role of causal knowledge in numerous areas of cognition. Many studies have investigated how causal relations are learned from observed correlations (Cheng, 1997; Gopnik et al., 2004; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; 2009; Lu et al., 2008; Sobel et al., 2004; Waldmann et al., 1995) . Others have tested their impact on various forms of reasoning, including inference (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Kemp et al., 2012; Oppenheimer, 2004; Rehder, 2006; 2009; Rehder & Burnett, 2005) , interventions (Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005) , decision making (Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009) , analogy (Holyoak et al., 2010; , and classification (Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Rehder 2003a; Rehder & Kim, 2006; 2009; .
The original goal of this proposal (intended to cover 3 years of research but funded for 18 months) was to study three aspects of human causal reasoning. The first is how people reason causally under uncertainty, that is, when beliefs are held with less than complete confidence. We address a particular application in which a representation of uncertainty resolves how inconsistencies among beliefs are resolved. The second aspect is how individual reason with "conjunctive causes", that is, when a cause only operates when it is accompanied by one or more other causes (a spark only yields fire when there is also fuel and oxygen). The third project concerns how people reason with inhibitory causes, that is, factors that disable or deactivate a causal mechanism. Research on the first two of these topics was conducted and is near completion, as now described.
Scientific Objectives of Research
The aim of this research was to advance both empirical knowledge about and theoretical accounts of human causal reasoning. One topic concerned how people reason causally under uncertainty. We take it as a given that knowledge comes to us in many forms. Much of what we know about the world comes from what we are told by others, but these sources can vary greatly in how informed (and trustworthy) they are and the effectiveness with which they communicate their message. Avoiding second--hand sources by observing things for oneself is important but has its own drawbacks: observations are always finite in number, are often incomplete (not all variables are measured), and are susceptible to measurement error (due, e.g., to failures of perception and memory). In many scientific domains, direct observation is impossible for all but highly trained experts. Finally, people may have default expectations (i.e., "priors') regarding, e.g., the strength and number of causal relationships. These facts mean that people have multiple sources of knowledge that vary in their reliability, format, and completeness. In this light, it is inevitable that inconsistencies among those sources will arise such in that they cannot be reconciled into a single coherent theory of the domain. Yet, people must draw inferences nevertheless. How do they do so?
The second topic concerns how people reason in light of the fact that causes usually do not operate in a vacuum but rather interact with other factors to produce their effects. E.g., the conjunction of two or more variables is often necessary for an outcome to occur. A spark may only produce fire if there is fuel to ignite, a virus may only cause disease if one's immune system is suppressed, the motive to commit murder may result in death only if the means to carry out the crime are available. Sometimes, conjunctive causes take the form of enablers. E.g., the presence of oxygen enables fire given spark and fuel. Although some studies have investigated the learning of interactive causes (e.g., Novick & Cheng, 2004) , in this research we examine their role in reasoning.
These projects each include both a theoretical and empirical component. Theoretically, we operate within a probabilistic framework that has become popular for modelling learning and reasoning with causal knowledge, namely, Bayesian networks or causal graphical models (hereafter, CGMs) . We propose extensions to represent uncertain causal beliefs and conjunctive causes. From these extensions we derive how causal inferences should be made, predictions that are tested by assessing how people reason under a variety of experimental conditions. We also assess our model's account by quantitative fitting our models to peoples' inferences.
Technical Approach Causal Reasoning Under Uncertainty: A Theoretical Model of Belief Integration
As argued, realistic causal reasoning involves inferences with individual beliefs that might be inconsistent with one another. On one hand, there is evidence from social psychology showing people are often untroubled by contradictory beliefs. Nevertheless, inconsistent beliefs might all contribute to an inference. We propose that reasoning can be modeled by a two--step process in which beliefs are first integrated into a consistent "causal model" that is then used to compute the inference. Modeling the process of integration in turn requires specifying the confidence with which beliefs are held and then how they are made consistent.
Representing causal uncertainty. We assume that uncertainties are represented in the form of probability density functions on each component of the causal model. We consider two fundamental types of knowledge: the probability that variables take on different values and the strength (or "power") of causal relationships that relate them. For simplicity, we only consider binary variables and generative causal links that operate independently. Let V represent the set of variables in the domain. For each v ∈ V, assume that v occurs (is "present" rather than "absent") with probability π v and that π v is a beta distribution that assigns a subjective degree of belief to every value in the range [0-1]. Next, let L be the set of explicit causal links in a model. For each l ∈ L, l's causal power (the probability that it operates when the cause is present) is characterized by a beta distribution π l . Finally, let E be the subset of variables in V that are effects. Each e ∈ E is assumed to potentially have causes that are not explicit in the model; the influence of these alterative or "background" causes are aggregated into a single causal link. The power of this background cause is a beta distribution π e . Each beta distribution π has an expected value of E[π] = α/[α + β]. The sum of α and β, referred to here as f(π), can be interpreted as the confidence with which the reasoner believes in E [π] .
Integrating causal beliefs. Let r, m, and b be vectors specifying the base rate of every variable in V, the strength of every link in L, and the strength of the background causes of every effect in E. A consistent model is one in which effects are neither under--nor over--determined, i.e., their base rates are exactly explained by their causes. For independent, generative causes, this constraint can be expressed by a "fuzzy or" equation relating the probability of an effect e to its parents,
where l.c and l.e are the cause and effect variables associated with causal link l, so that the product ranges over all the causal links between e and its parents. We stipulate that the joint probability distribution on the parameters of consistent models can be formed from the parameters' individual π distributions, with those parameters that imply under--and over--determination of any effect variable assigned a probability of 0, when otherwise.
The most likely causal model parameters that resolve potential inconsistencies among causal beliefs are the r, m, and b that maximize Eq. 2.
Testing the model. We created experimental analogs of situations we believe are common: one has some theoretical beliefs (i.e., causal laws) and some statistical knowledge (e.g., facts about the base rates of events) and these beliefs are mutually inconsistent. Eq. 2 works to ensure that reasoners' inferences reflect consistent beliefs. E.g., the most likely base rate for variable v will reflect not only what one has knows about v, but also the strengths of the causal relationships in which v is involved (and the base rates of other variables to which v is causally related). Conversely, the most likely strength for causal link l will reflect not only what we know about l but also what is known about the base rates of its cause and effect (and the strengths of causal links in which they are involved). These claims are tested in two experiments assessing adults' causal inferences.
Reasoning With Conjunctive Causes
As argued, causes usually only produce their effects when conjoined with other factors, such as enabling conditions. Fig. 1A presents a CGM in which variables C1 and C2 are causes of variable E. By itself, however, this model says nothing about the functional relationship between E and its causes. Fig. 1B represents the fact that C1 and C2 are independent causes of E-that is, that E might be caused by C1 or C2. Fig. 1C represents that C1 and C2 are conjunctive causes of E-E is brought about only when C1 and C2 are both present.
We tested how adults reason with independent vs. conjunctive causes. To assess our model we adopted the novel methodology of asking people to make three distinct types of inferences, namely, judgments of joint, conditional, and marginal
probability. We specify the joint probability, from which the other types of judgments can be derived. In general, we have
Assuming that C1 and C2 have no hidden common causes, Eq. 3 becomes
p(E|C1,C2) can be written as a function of parameters that characterize the generative causal mechanisms that relate E to its causes. For independent causes,
where mC 1 ,E and mC
2
,E represent the probabilities that those mechanisms will produce E when C1 and C2 are present, respectively, bE represent the probability that E will be brought about by one or more additional causes not shown in Fig. 1 , and ind(Ci) returns 1 when Ci is present and 0 otherwise. For conjunctive causes,
where mC 1 ,C 2 ,E is the probability that C1 and C2 will bring about E when both are present and ind(C1, C2) returns 1 when C1 and C2 are both present and 0 otherwise.
Testing the model. We instructed subjects on scenarios involving both independent and conjunctive causes and asked them to make judgments of joint, conditional, and marginal probability. Expt. 1 directly compared subjects' inferences with independent and conjunctive causes. Expt. 2 tested how the pattern of inferences changes as a function of the strength of the causal relations.
Another goal was to assess proposals regarding how people often augment causal representations with additional knowledge. Rehder & Burnett (2005) found that people's causal inferences about category features exhibited a systematic deviation from the predictions of CGMs in which a feature was rated as more likely when other features were present, even those features were (according to the Markov condition) conditionally independent. Rehder & Burnett suggested that this typicality effect arises because people assume that category features are related via hidden causal mechanisms. On this account, we should also see similar effect in the present experiments, which also tested category features.
Progress Made & Results Obtained Causal Reasoning Under Uncertainty
The proposed model of causal uncertainty and belief integration was tested in two experiments by providing subjects with multiple sources of both empirical and theoretical information. Each experiment used a 2 x 2 design in which one factor varied the base rates of the causes and the other the strength (Expt. 1) or number (Expt. 2) of causal links. Manipulations of these two types of causal model parameters should result in changes to not only the parameters themselves but also to the other parameters in the model in order to achieve model consistency.
Due to space limitation, only Expt. 2. is presented here (see McDonnell et al., in preparation, for a complete report of both experiments). Subjects learned about 4 binary variables (referred to here as C1, C2, C3, and E) in the domains of economics,
meteorology, or sociology. E was described as having one cause (C1) or three (C1, C2, and C3). The cause variables were described as being either rare (appearing in 25% of instances) or common (75%). All subjects were told that the effect E was "somewhat common," occurring with probability 44%, and that it had no other causes besides those on which they were instructed. These knowledge sources were described as reflecting the "beliefs," "estimates," and "tentative theories" of domain experts rather than established facts. Subjects were then asked to make a number of judgments of both conditional (predict one variable from others) and joint (the likelihood of a particular set of variables) probability.
In some cells of this experiment the supplied information was inconsistent. E.g., the rare/1--link condition is inconsistent because, according to Eq. 1, rare causes and one causal link (and the absence of any other causes of E) imply a base rate for E of only .125, as compared to the instructed base rate of .44. To compensate, subjects' inferences should thus reflect an updated model with causes that are more prevalent, stronger causal links, an effect that is less prevalent, or some combination of all of these. Conversely, in the common/3--link condition the effect is over--determined because common causes and strong causal links imply a base rate for E of .76 as compared to .44. To compensate, subjects' inferences should reflect a model with causes that are less prevalent, causal links that are weaker, an effect that is more prevalent, or some combination of all of these.
We also asked whether subjects would update their causal model in light of data they observe. To this end, after making inferences on the basis of the instructed information, subjects observed samples of 32 economies (or weather systems or societies). We refer the reader to McDonnell et al. for these results.
Results. To characterize subjects' causal model, their ratings of both joint and conditional probability in each block were fit to a causal model with one effect and three independent and generative causes. These fits yielded a total of 8 causal model parameters per subject per block: rC 1 , rC 2 , rC 3 , m1, m2, m3, b, and rE. For notational convenience we refer to rC i and rE as ci and e, respectively.
With subjects' causal models thus characterized, we now turn to the central question of whether those models exhibit the predicted pattern of integration of inconsistent knowledge sources. Fig. 2 presents the effects of our two manipulations on subjects' fitted causal model parameters. (It also includes the fits of our theoretical model, discussed below.) For comparison, we only present those parameters that were involved in a causal link in all conditions (i.e., c1, m1, e, and b). First, a main effect of causal bases rates in Fig. 2A confirmed the success of that manipulation. Importantly, this manipulation also increased the prevalence of the effect (parameter e in Fig. 2C ) and decreased the strength of the background causes (parameter b in Fig. 2B ). That is, to accommodate the greater prevalence of the causes, subjects compensated by increasing the base rate of the effect and lowering the strength of the alternative causes. These changes are examples of the types of responses predicted by our theoretical model of belief integration. There was no effect of the causes' base rates on causal strengths (parameter m1 in Fig. 2B) .
The manipulation of the number of causal links also had two important effects. First, it reduced the base rate of C1 (parameter c1 in Fig. 2A) . Second, it reduced the strength of the C1→E causal relationship (parameter m1 in Fig. 2B ). That is, to accommodate two additional causal links, subjects compensated by decreasing the effectiveness of the C1→E causal link (by reducing both c1 and m1). Again, these changes were predicted by our model as being necessary to obtain belief consistency. The number of causal links affected neither the prevalence of the effect nor the strength of alternative causes (parameters e and b). Theoretical modeling. We also assessed our theoretical model by fitting it to the results in Fig. 2 . Recall that although it specifies that reasoners will adjust their beliefs so as to reason with a consistent model, it does not specify which beliefs should be adjusted in the absence of any information about the confidence with they are held. Accordingly, the confidence that reasoners have in each instructed model component is represented as four free parameters: f c (the base rates of the cause), f m (the strength of the causal links), f b (the strength of alternative causes), and f e (the base rate of the effect).
In addition, because we assume that subjects do not perfectly encode the initial numerical information provided about each model component, those are free parameters as well. Let parameters in m , in b , and in e represent the instructed values of m (causal link strengths, described to subjects as .50), b (the strength of alternative causes, described as 0), and e (the base rate of the effect, described as .44), respectively. in m was the initial strength of all three links in the 3--link conditions and C1→E in the 1--link conditions; otherwise, the initial strength was set to 0. Parameters in c--rare and in c--common represent the initial base rates of the causes in the rare and common conditions, respectively (described to subjects as .25 and .75). Subjects' judgments in each block were fit assuming each π distribution was updated to reflect the observed samples. This model was fit to the group level causal model parameters in Expt. 2, (i.e., the 8 parameters [c1, c2, c3, m1, m2, m3, b Fig. 2 . Fig. 2 reveals that the model is able to capture each of the effects shown in Fig. 2 . The base rate of C1 (parameter c1) and the strength of the C1→E link (m1) both decrease as the number of causal relations increase ( Figs. 2A and B) . And, the base rate of the effect (e) increases and the decrease in alternative causes (b) decreases as the base rate of the causes increases (Figs. 2C and D) , although e's increase is clearly smaller in magnitude than that exhibited by subjects. The insensitivity of e to changes in the other model components is a manifestation of the relatively large confidence placed in its initial value (f e = 845 vs. all other fs < 400).
Discussion. These result provide initial support for our claim that causal inferences are made by first integrating multiple, inconsistent beliefs into a coherent domain theory. Much more needs to be done of course. If our account is correct, then inferences should be affected by manipulations of confidence (low confidence parameters should undergo more changes than high ones) and indeed this is our next experiment. And, although the fitting results shows that our models hold promise as an account for these sort of data, the fact that subjects were relatively insensitive to the data they observed reduces the effective number of data points, raising the specter of overfitting. Again, experiments are planned to increase subjects' sensitivity to data and thus provide a more stringent test of the model.
Reasoning With Conjunctive Causes
The predictions of the joint, conditional, and marginal probability derived from CGMs for independent vs. conjunctive causes were tested in two experiments. As mentioned, Expt. 1 compared subjects' inferences with independent vs. conjunctive causes (and whether those differences corresponded to the predictions presented above) whereas Expt. 2 assessed how they are affected by the strength of the causal relations. Due space limitations only the results of Expt. 1. are presented here (see Rehder, in preparation, for a complete report of Expts. 1 and 2). In Expt. 1, subjects were taught novel categories with 6 features. Within each category, each of the feature triplets was described as forming either an independent (Fig. 1B) or conjunctive (Fig. 1C) network. Subjects were then presented with marginal, joint, and conditional probability judgments. 48 NYU undergraduates served as subjects.
Results. Feature inference (i.e., conditional probability) ratings are presented in Figs. 3A--C. Fig. 3A presents ratings regarding the effect given the presence of 0, 1, or 2 of the causes. Unsurprisingly, subjects judged that the presence of the effect was rated to be very likely (ratings > 90) when both causes were present and very unlikely (< 15) when both were absent for both types of causal networks. But when just one cause was present, subjects were much more likely to predict the effect for the independent (rating of 80) as compared to conjunctive (27) network. This result confirms that subjects are sensitive to the form of the functional relationship that relates effects and their causes. Fig. 3A also reveals a way that the ratings differed from the predictions. Subjects judged that the conjunctive effect was more probable in the presence of one cause (27) vs. none (11) when in fact those ratings should be equal. This result corresponds to the typicality effect described earlier in which features that should be conditionally independent are dependent instead (Rehder & Burnett, 2005) . Fig. 3B shows ratings when subjects predicted a cause given the presence of the effect, as a function of whether the other cause was present. When causes were independent, the cause was rated higher when the other cause was absent (84) vs. present (70), reflecting the well--known explaining away phenomenon in which the presence of one cause that accounts for an effect makes other causes less likely. In contrast, this pattern was reversed for conjunctive causes (58 vs. 94). We refer to this phenomenon as exoneration. E.g., murder requires not only the motive but also the means, so discovering that a murder suspect didn't possess the means to carry out the crime (e.g., proximity to the victim) decreases his likely guilt. Fig. 3 . Empirical results from Expt. 1. Inference (conditional probability) judgments are in panels A--C, classification judgments (joint probability) are in panels D--E, and feature likelihood (marginal probability) judgments are in panel F. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Fits of the underlying mechanism model are superimposed in red on the observed data. Finally, Fig. 3C shows subjects' prediction of a cause given the absence of the effect. A conjunctive cause was rated higher when the other conjunct was absent (32 vs. 20 when present), reflecting another kind of exoneration: Your sister, who failed to show up for Thanksgiving, is exonerated when you learn that her flight (the enabler) was canceled. In contrast, independent causes exhibit a typicality effect in which a cause was rated as more likely when the other cause was present (27 vs. 19) even though those causes were supposed to be conditionally independent. Classification (i.e., joint probability) ratings are presented in Figs. 3D and 3E. When the effect was present (Fig. 3D) objects received low ratings when both causes were absent and high ones when they were both present, as expected. But ratings were much higher when one cause was present for independent vs. conjunctive causes (63 vs. 39). When the effect was absent (Fig. 3E) , ratings decreased as the number of independent causes increased. Rehder & Kim (2006; refer to this phenomenon as a coherence effect in which an object is a better category member when its features corroborate the category's causal links (cause and effect features both present or both absent) and a worse one when they violate those links (cause present and effect absent or vice versa). For conjunctive causes, ratings reflected the predicted nonmonotonic change in ratings as the number of causes increased, with the item with one cause receiving the highest ratings.
The feature likelihood (i.e., marginal probability) ratings in Fig. 3F exhibit the expected interaction between network type and feature type: an effect was rated as less probable when it was conjunctive rather than independent (66 vs. 77).
Theoretical modeling. To assess whether the independent and conjunctive CGMs in Fig. 1 also provide a quantitative account for these results, they were simultaneously fit to the inference, classification, and feature likelihood ratings. Because it is known a priori that those models will be unable to account for the typicality effect, we followed Rehder & Burnett (2005) and augmented them with a node representing an underlying mechanism (UM), as shown in Fig. 4 . The c parameters associated with the four explicit causes in Fig. 2 were assumed to be equal as were all m parameters and all b parameters. cUM is the probability that UM is present and mUM is the power of the causal links between it and the 6 category features. A γ parameter for each judgment type applied a nonlinear power transformation of the probability derived the CGMs onto subjects' ratings.
This model was fit to each subject's 30 ratings with parameters that minimized squared error. The best fitting model parameters averaged over subjects were c = .505, m = .704, b = .148, cUM = .609, and mUM = .763. The predictions are presented in Fig. 3 superimposed on the empirical data. The figure shows that the model was able to account for most of the qualitative effects seen in this experiment, including explaining away and exoneration effects in inference, coherence effects in classification, and the marginal probabilities of the independent and conjunctive effects. Importantly, it also accounted for the typicality effect (e.g., the larger ratings when predicting a conjunctive effect given one vs. zero causes; Fig. 3A ).
Of course, Fig. 3 also reveals some mispredictions. E.g., the model predicts a smaller explaining away effect than exhibited by subjects (Fig. 3B ) and overpredicts the marginal probability of the independent cause (Fig. 3F) . Nevertheless, the model's ability to account for the effects in Fig. 3 resulted in a correlation between the observed and predicted ratings of .984 (.895 averaged over subjects). 
Significance of Results & Impact on Science Integrating Causal Beliefs
Most studies of causal reasoning ask subjects to reason in simplified condition involving a domain theory that is simple and free of inconsistencies. While these findings are valuable, realistic causal reasoning usually take place in the context of multiple sources of possibly contradictory information. We created experimental analogs of a situation in which one has some theoretical beliefs (e.g., candidate causal laws) and some elementary statistical knowledge (e.g., facts about the base rates of events) and the later are inconsistent with the former. Our subjects' inferences reflected the sort of changes needed to reason with a coherent causal theory of the domain. Making causes more prevalent resulted in alternative causes becoming weaker and the effect becoming more prevalent. Making causal relations more numerous resulted in the causes becoming rarer and other causal links becoming weaker. We know of no other model that is capable of predicting these sorts of effects. It also provided a moderately successful quantitative account of these processes.
Our experiments did not exhaust the types of knowledge that may influence a causal inference of course. We presented statistical information about variables' base rates in both verbal form and samples of observations, but real--world observations are often incomplete in that some variables have missing values. Correlational information might come to us in verbal form rather than via observations (e.g., "mental illness and homelessness tend to go together"). And so on. The challenge faced by theorists then is to specify how these many different kinds of knowledge sources are integrated. We believe that our model represents the start of a solution to this problem. Finally, our model may have much to say about not just how beliefs are integrated but also how they are revised, that is, permanently changed in light of counterevidence. Although social psychology tells us it happens rarely, people do occasionally revise their beliefs, and we suspect that the basic factors embodied in our model are some of the precursors. E.g., beliefs that are highly inconsistent with others and thus need to be greatly modified during the integration process may eligible for more permanent revisions. More extreme revisions might involve not only change to parameters but also structural changes in which causal relations are added or deleted from the model. In this manner, the integration of contradictory beliefs becomes another factor that determines how one chooses between "causal hypotheses" (i.e., alternative causal structures) (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005) .
Causal Reasoning Under Uncertainty
This work opens new avenues of research into how people acquire, represent, and use their beliefs about the reliability of acquired knowledge. Although our model of uncertainty was developed to specify how beliefs are integrated, it is clear that virtually all causal inference will be affected by the confidence with which beliefs are held. E.g., all else being equal, one will judge that C1 is more likely than C2 to be responsible for E if the C1→E causal link is held with more confidence than C2→E; for the same reason, if one wants to intervene to bring about E one should manipulate C1 rather than C2. One will infer an effect from a cause more certainly when the enabling conditions necessary for the causal mechanism to operate are confidently assumed to be present. And so forth.
Although our representation of uncertainty was sufficient to account for our empirical results, its assumption that the distributions of the individual causal model parameters are independent is certain to be unrealistic in some situations. E.g., Lu et al. (2008) have modeled the traditional causal learning experiment as one in which the prior distribution is a two--dimensional density function on (a) the strength of the to--be--learned causal link (parameter m in our terms) and (b) the strength of alternative causes (parameter b). When density is massed around either large m/small b or small m/large b, this model captures subjects' apparent preferences for a single causal explanation of the effect. (By so doing, it reproduces a number of the effects that Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005 , accounted for in terms of a hypothesis--testing model; also see Lombrozo, 2007 .) Disjunctive hypotheses of this sort might take other forms. E.g., it may be conveyed through explicit instruction ("either mental illness or unemployment is the cause of homelessness").
Reasoning with Conjunctive Causes
One question asked in this research is whether causal inferences are sensitive to the functional relationship that can relate an effect to its causes. The answer is that they are: judgments of conditional, joint, and marginal probability all differed depending on whether causes were described as independent or conjunctive. Moreover, those inferences exhibited the patterns predicted by a generative representation of causal knowledge. When causes were independent, subjects exhibited explaining away, an expected result given past demonstrations of that effect in the social and cognitive literatures. But when causes were conjunctive, subjects exhibited what we referred to as exoneration effects. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that exoneration effects are entailed by conjunctions causes and that human causal reasoners in fact exhibit that effect.
Other frameworks for representing causal knowledge are unable to readily explain these results. E.g., simple spreading activation networks are clearly unable to account for the present result because such networks are insensitive to both the distinction between independent and conjunctive causes. Proposals that treat such knowledge as a dependency network (Sloman et al., 1998 ) is sensitive to causal direction (E "depends on" C1 and C2) but is also unable to explain effects that depend on the nature of the functional relationship between causes and effects.
Our experiments also replicated previous research showing that people's inferences exhibit a violation of conditional independence known as the typicality effect, and extended this effect to conjunctive causes. Model fitting showed CGMs augmented with an additional "underlying mechanism" were able to almost fully account for the inferences generated for both independent and conjunctive causes.
Finally, we know of no other study that has tested models of causal reasoning using multiple types of judgments (in our cause judgments of marginal, conditional, and joint probability). This methodological innovation is important because of well known problems associated with establishing for the psychological reality of mental representations. Going forward, we believe that accounting for these sorts of "converging operations" (i.e., multiple types of judgments) should be the standard against which theories of causal inference should be held.
